All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason. |
What can I know? What ought I to do? What can I hope? |
I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief. |
So act that your principle of action might safely be made a law for the whole world. |
From such crooked wood as that which man is made of, nothing straight can be fashioned. |
He who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals. Topics: Animal |
In law a man is guilty when he violates the rights of others. In ethics he is guilty if he only thinks of doing so. |
A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to any other purpose. |
Nothing is divine but what is agreeable to reason. |
To be is to do. Topics: Short |
It is beyond a doubt that all our knowledge that begins with experience. |
Intuition and concepts constitute... the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. |
Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be carved. |
But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. |
Two things awe me most, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. |
Live your life as though your every act were to become a universal law. |
Immaturity is the incapacity to use one's intelligence without the guidance of another. |
All the interests of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? |
Seek not the favor of the multitude; it is seldom got by honest and lawful means. But seek the testimony of few; and number not voices, but weigh them. |
The only objects of practical reason are therefore those of good and evil. For by the former is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason; by the latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of reason. |